We do not admit it, till the word condition is explained. His Second Proposition erected on the First, is:—" The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than what is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self—object *plus* subject •^•thing, or thought, *mecum*. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of d^gnition." We admit as a psychological fact, that the consciousness of self co-exists with every mental act, but so also does the exercise of certain senses, as the sense of our bodily frame, and the sense of touch; but surely this does not shew that our cognition of an object, say of a distant hill, is a cognition of this '*hill plus* a sense of the eye with which we look at it. Consciousness runs through all our mental states, and among others our ratiocinations; but this does not prove that the object before the mind in reasoning is this premiss *plus* self, and this other premiss *plus* self, and this conclusion *plus* self, and this relation of premiss and conclusion *plus* self. Carry out the principle, and the very apprehension of the arguments of the "Institutes" becomes an apprehension of these arguments *plus* self. This lands us logically in an idealism, in which not only the material world, but all truth—the very existence and being of a God—ceases to be a reality, independent of the contemplative mind, and becomes an object *mecum.* It is all true that we know ourselves when we know external objects, but we know external objects as different from ourselves, and "having a reality independent of ourselves. The external object is known along with the internal self, but is known as an object independent of self, and not as an object *plus* self. The cognitions of self, and of not-self, coexist, but the cognitions apprehend two objects as having a separate existence. The one of these propositions is as certain as the other, and the one cannot be used to set aside the other. It is one of the conditions of the legitimate use of first principles, (as stated by Hamilton, edit, of Reid, p. 747,) " that we embrace all [and not merely some one of] the original data of consciousness." When we have removed the first two propositions, the castle of cards must fall. We have noticed that in rearing his fabric, Mr. F. is ever, without acknowledgment, assuming principles, which are not clearer than those which they are employed to set aside. His Counter Propositions are at times mere *foils,* constructed by himself to set off his own argument; but they may have this good effect, that they will compel psychologists (of whom he has a great hatred) to observe the mind more carefully, and enunciate the facts more accurately. The book is written cleverly, in the magazine style, and has not a few literary beauties, and will be attractive to some as an exhibition of speculative ingenuity. But our hope is, that it will be regarded by the sober British thinkers as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole style of speculation, of which it is a specimen. If this is not the effect, the next phenomenon appearing in the philosophic firmament must be a Hume or a Fichte.

ART. TIL—OPERATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT IN THE HUMAE MIND.—(PAGE 273.)

We have endeavoured (Art. III.) to point out the way in which the principle of cause and effect operates in the material universe: it is by the action of corporeal substances upon each other, according to their properties. A material substance is **in** itself passive. Apart from something external to itself, it will never change. It